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IDEAS OF RELEVANCE TO LAW
MORTIMER
LECTURE

I:

J. ADLER*

TRUTH, DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE**

A
One cannot be both a liar and a skeptic (and, of course, it is
preferable to be neither). The liar understands what truth is and
even believes that some statements are true and some are false.
The first element in lying consists in saying in words the opposite of what you think or believe is true. The second element
in lying consists in intending to deceive and willingness to injure
by that deception. (The white lie has a contrary intention so far
as injury is concerned.) A third aspect of lying is whether one
has an obligation to tell the truth to everyone-or only to some.
The extreme skeptic cannot be a liar unless he is a liar when
he declares himself to be an extreme skeptic for whom there is
no truth; nothing is either true or false. If that is what the extreme skeptic really thinks, then he is at least telling us the
truth when he tells us that that is what he thinks. But he cannot
tell us a lie about anything other than his own state of mind or
feeling.
What the extreme skeptic denies is not the possibility of
truth or falsity in speech, but only the possibility of truth or
falsity in thought.
* Ph.D., Columbia University, 1928; Director of the Institute for Philosophical Research which he founded in 1952; Chairman of the Board of Editors of the

Encyclopaedia Britannica's

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD;

public lecturer;

writer and co-author of several books.
** These lectures; which are part of the continuing Donley Memorial Lectures, were delivered at West Virginia University College of Law Mar. 23-24,
1981. Dr. Adler drew freely from his book, Six GREAT IDEAS. It was scheduled to
be published in April 1981 by the MacMillan Co.
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The definition of truth and falsity in thought is as follows. It
is the agreement or correspondence between what one thinks is
the case and what is the case in reality.
Truth and falsity in thought parallel truth and falsity in
speech. Truth in speech may accompany falsity in thought, and
falsity in speech may accompany truth in thought. For this to be
possible, it must also be possible for us to be mistaken or in error in our judgment about what is true or false. (I will return to
this very important point later.)
This theory of truth and falsity rests on the following
presuppositions: first, the existence of an independent reality
which is what it is whether or not we know it and regardless of
what we happen to be thinking about it; and second, the determinateness of that independent reality. This is made clear by
the principle of contradiction as an ontological principle. Nothing can both be and not be at one and the same time. Nothing
can both have a certain attribute or characteristic and not have
it at one and the same time. This principle is self-evidently true;
you cannot think the opposite.
The logical counterpart of the principle of contradiction tells
us that to think truly, we must avoid contradicting ourselves.
We cannot both affirm and deny one and the same proposition at
one and the same time. It cannot be thought by us to be both
true and false. We cannot answer the same question by saying
both Yes and No at one and the same time.
Now let us consider the position of the extreme skeptic. To
say that there is nothing either true or false, or to say there cannot be a true or false statement is tantamount to denying the
presupposition of truth-denying the ontological principle of an
independent and determinate reality, and flouting the logical
principle of contradiction.
Here is the refutation of the extreme skeptic. Consider the
statement: "No statement is either true or false." If that is true
(which the skeptic asserts), then he has contradicted himself,
because at least one statement is true. If that is false, then there
may be one or more statements that are true as well as this one
statement's being false. And if that statement is itself neither
true nor false, why should we pay any attention to it?
There is no point in arguing with the extreme skeptic since
he is willing to contradict himself at every step of the way. No
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/3
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one who lives in the common sense world of practical affairs can
operate on the basis of extreme skepticism.
B
Two moderate forms of skepticism involve mistaken interpretations of the matter.
Consider the statement: "That's true for me, even if it isn't
true for you." If the statement merely intends to call attention
to the fact that individuals can differ or disagree in their judgments about what is in fact the truth of the matter, it raises no
special difficulty.
To acknowledge the possibility of differences of opinion or
disagreements concerning what is true or false is not to be skeptical. In fact, not to do so is to go to the opposite extreme of extreme dogmatism: only what I declare is true is true; if you disagree with me, you are wrong.
Unfortunately, people who say "That's true for me" make
the mistake of adding "And that's all there is to it." When they
do this, their moderate skepticism turns into an extreme subjectivism. There is no objective aspect of truth: there is only what
is true for me (only the subjective aspect).
Such extreme subjectivism is just as self-refuting as extreme skepticism. What can one mean when one says "true for
me" if one does not also claim that the statement I judge to be
true is objectively true? "True for me" can mean no more than
"I like it," "I want to think it," "I prefer it to the opposite." And
if that is all there is to it, then extreme subjectivism becomes
extreme skepticism.
The other mistaken form of moderate skepticism is exemplified in the statement: "That was once true relative to the
circumstances that then existed, but it is no longer true."
If the statement merely intends to call attention to the fact
that what we once thought to be true (at an earlier time or place
and under different circumstances), we no longer think is true, it
raises no special difficulty. To acknowledge the possibility of
change or alteration in our judgments about what is true or
false is not to be skeptical. In fact, not to do so, to insist that our
judgments about what is true are infallible, incorrigible, or unalterable is to go to the opposite extreme of dogmatism.
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Unfortunately, people who say "That was true some time
ago, but it is no longer true" make the mistake of adding "And
that's all there is to it." When they do this, their moderate skepticism turns into an extreme relativism. They deny the immutability of objective truth when what they should be denying
is the immutability of our subjective judgments about what is
true or false.
The mutability of our judgments has no bearing on the immutability of truth in its objective aspect. If any statement is
ever true, it is always true, and unchangeably so, regardless of
how we change our minds about it. This holds even for changing
aspects of reality itself: the addition of a precise time specification in the statement makes it possible for the statement to be
immutably true.
By correcting these mistakes we reach the defensible and
sound skepticism that wisdom recommends we adopt.
Most of the judgments we make about what is true or false
are fallible and corrigible. They are mutable, not final. They
have a future, in which they may be corrected or amended in
some way, or replaced by other judgments that are truer.
The realm of judgments that have a future comprises those
judgments with regard to which all relevant evidence may not
yet be at hand, and the thinking we have done may not be as
good as possible. Hence, when new evidence is found or when
better thinking is done (or when we discover and correct errors
or inadequacies in prior thinking), we change our minds and
alter our judgments concerning the true and false.
The most impressive example of this is in jury trials of questions of fact. They imply two standards of proof: (1) by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not to be true); (2)
beyond a reasonable doubt (but still not beyond all doubt, not beyond the shadow of a doubt).
The judicial reason for re-opening a case or having a second
trial may be either to allow for the introduction of new evidence,
or to correct a procedural error that may have affected the deliberations of the jury. Reversal is possible even if the original
verdict was beyond a reasonable doubt.
What I have just said about jury trials applies to all fields of
research, historical and scientific, to everything that is in what I
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/3
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am going to call "the realm of doubt," which is the realm of judgments that have a future-judgments that are subject to
change, that are not final, infallible, and incorrigible.
C
Do all of our judgments fall in the realm of doubt? Are there
none that belong to the realm of certitude?
The realm of certitude is the realm of judgments that are
subjectively as immutable as objective truth is. These are judgments for which we dare to claim finality, infallibility, and incorrigibility-without being dogmatic. They are, therefore, judgments that have no future.
What judgments have this status? All self-evident truths:
judgments the opposite of which it is impossible for us to think,
such as the principle of contradiction; the statement about
wholes and parts involving indefinables; the statement that no
triangle has any diagonals involving definitions.
All empirically falsified generalizations 'have this status
also. No empirical generalization is beyond the shadow of a
doubt. One negative instance falsifies such generalizations. Once
falsified, it is always false-immutably.
Finally, this status belongs to evident truth, such as my own
existence, or the existence of physical objects perceptually present to me. Beyond all doubt? Beyond the shadow of a doubt?
No, not quite, because of the possibility of hallucination. When I
am perceiving, not hallucinating, that which I am perceiving
really exists independently of my perceiving it. The only question here is whether I am in fact perceiving. That is the shadow
of a doubt which I cannot remove. Nevertheless, for all practical
purposes, such evident truths are certain rather than probable:
what we call practical or moral certainty, which falls just a little
short of epistemological certitude.
Except for the two or three types of judgments just indicated (self-evident truths, empirically falsified generalizations,
and evident truths), all other judgments fall in the sphere of
doubt: all our common-sense generalizations, most of which are
immoderate because they go beyond the evidence and are subject to falsification; all of the generalizations made in the empirical sciences; almost all scientific theories or hypotheseswhich are subject to correction, amendment, or rejection in the
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light of new evidence or better thinking; a great deal of what we
call "historical knowledge" including both what we regard as
historical facts and also the interpretation of these facts.
An apparent paradox results. As we normally use the word
"knowledge," we speak of our common-sense knowledge of the
world in which we live, of our scientific knowledge of it, or our
historical knowledge of its past, and so on.
We distinguish between the realm of knowledge and the
realm of opinion, as follows: knowledge consists in the possession
of the truth. The phrase "false knowledge" is self-contradictory.
The phrase "true knowledge" is redundant. Only opinion, not
knowledge, can be either true or false.
That beipg our customary usage or acceptance, how can we
place common-sense knowledge, scientific knowledge, and historical knowledge in the realm of doubt-the realm of judgments which, though now regarded by us as true, may turn out
to be false when new evidence is forthcoming or better thinking
is done?
It would appear that what we call knowledge is no better
than opinion, if it can turn out to be false. Must we restrict our
use of the word "knowledge" to judgments that clearly belong in
the realm of certitude and refrain from using the word "knowledge" for any judgments that belong in the realm of doubt?
The resolution of this apparent paradox is as follows. It consists in noting a strong and weak use of the word "knowledge"
and a strong and weak use of the word "opinion."
In its strong use, the word "knowledge" refers to judgments
that belong in the realm of certitude. Here it would be wrong to
say "I believe" or "I opine" or even "I think." Here we must say
"I know." In its weak use, the word "knowledge" and in its
strong use, the word "opinion" refer to a middle ground.
Here it is appropriate to say "I believe on reasonable
grounds" or "I have reasonable grounds for believing, opining,
or thinking," and, as of this moment, that is equivalent to saying
"I know," but only as of this moment. Here we have, not final or
incorrigible truth of the kind we have in the realm of certitude
(knowledge in the strong sense), but only that which is truer
than anything else at the moment.
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That which is truer than alternatives may become truer still
with additional evidence or better thinking (may have even
more reasonable grounds). Or it may be replaced by an alternative that is truer in the light of more evidence or better thinking. Nevertheless, our claim of truth here is not an unsupported
claim. On the contrary, it is the truth we must affirm in the light
of the best evidence we now have and the best thinking we can
now do.
At the opposite extreme is mere opinion-totally unsupported opinion, not knowledge in even the weaker sense of that
term. When we express, espouse, or insist upon such opinions,
we do so only as a matter of personal prejudice. It is an act of
will on our part, not an act of thought. Here, if we use the word
"truth" at all, we do so in the purely subjective sense: "true for
me, and that's all there is to it." It may still remain the case that
such opinions are either objectively true or false, since whatever
is asserted about the way things are may either agree or not
agree with the way that in fact things really are. But, since we
can offer no reasonable grounds to support such opinions (since
we have no evidence in favor of them or thinking to base them
on), our a~sertion of them reduces to "I like to think that. .. "
Herein lies the radical diremption between the sphere of
truth and the sphere of taste-the sphere of supported judgments and the sphere of unsupported prejudices. The sphere of
taste consists of all opinions that, being unsupported, are unarguable. It may also include opinions that are not only unsupported but are intrinsically unsupportable. Hence the fundamental maxim: de gustibus non disputandum est. This applies to all
opinions that are nothing but expressions of our likes and dislikes and cannot be anything else (the intrinsically unsupportable); and also to those opinions that are unsupported at a given
time, but which may nevertheless not be intrinsically unsupportable.
In sharp contrast, the sphere of truth consists of those opinions (in the strong sense, which is identical with knowledge in
the weak sense) that are intrinsically supportable and that are
also based on reasonable grounds-supported by what evidence
is available and what thinking has been done. Here the judgment we make is necessitated by evidence or reasons: it is not
voluntary or an entirely free choice on our part. Here the fun-
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damental maxim is the very opposite: de veritate disputandum
est.
Skepticism with regard to truth reared its head in antiquity.
Confronted with it, the ancients came up with its refutation. Not
so with regard to goodness. Skepticism about value
judgments-about the validity of our attribution of goodness to
objects and about the truth of any statement that contains the
words "ought" or "ought not"- begins in the modern world.
Without having been confronted with that brand of skepticism,
the ancients nevertheless provided us with clues enabling us to
separate that aspect of the good that has the objectivity of truth
from that aspect that is entirely subjective and relative to the
individual.
At the dawn of modern thought, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza advanced the view that "good" was merely the
name we gave to those things that in fact we happened to desire
or like. Goodness is not a discoverable property of the things
themselves. We simply call them good because we desire them.
If we had an aversion to them instead, we would call them bad.
Since desires and aversions are matters of individual temperament, nurture, and predilection, there is nothing that all human
beings agree upon as deserving to be called good or bad. Just as
the skeptic concerning truth says that what is true for me may
not be true for you, so here the skeptic says that what is good
for you may not be good for me.
A century or more later, David Hume added another arrow
to the quiver of skepticism about values. He pointed out that
from our knowledge of the facts about nature or reality (as complete as one might wish it to be), we cannot validate a single
value judgment that ascribes to an object a goodness that makes
it true to say that all men ought to desire it.
Those who, before or after Hume, identify the good with
pleasure or the pleasing, do not avoid the thrust of his skeptical
challenge. Rather, they reinforce it, for what pleases one individual may not please another; and, in any case, the goodness
that is identified with pleasure does not reside in the object but
in the emotional experience of the individual.
Hume's challenge is further reinforced in our own century
by a group of thinkers whose names are associated with a doc-
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trine that has come to be called "noncognitive ethics." They use
the word "ethics" to refer to the whole sphere of moral judgments about good and bad, or right and wrong, especially in the
form of prescriptions about what ought and ought not to be
sought or what ought and ought not to be done. Their dismissal
of ethics as "noncognitive" is their way of saying that statements that assert an ought or an ought-not cannot be either true
or false.
Not capable of being either true or false, such assertions are
noncognitive. They do not belong to the sphere of knowledge,
even in the weaker sense of that term, which connotes verifiable
or supportable opinion. Thrown out of the sphere of truth, they
are relegated to the sphere of taste. They are at best expressions of personal predilection or prejudice, entirely relative to
the feelings, impulses, whims, or wishes of the individual.
If we ask why judgments about what ought to be desired or
done are totally incapable of being either true or false, the answer appeals to an understanding first formulated in antiquity
and one that these twentieth-century exponents of a noncognitive ethics adopt.
Once we conceive the truth of a statement as residing in its
correspondence with the facts of the matter under consideration, with the way things really are, we are led to the conclusion
that only statements that assert that something is or is not the
case can be either true or false-true if they assert that which is
in fact the way things are, false if they assert the opposite.
All such statements can be characterized as descriptions of
reality. Statements that contain the words "ought" or "ought
not" are prescriptions or injunctions, not descriptions of anything. If our understanding of truth and falsity conceives them
as properties that can be found only in descriptions, then we
cannot avoid the skeptical conclusion that prescriptive statements cannot be either true or false.
A moment's reflection will lead us to see that the only way
this skeptical conclusion can be avoided is by expanding our
understanding of truth. Can we find another mode of truth, one
that is appropriate to prescriptions or injunctions, just as the
more familiar mode of truth is appropriate to descriptions or
statements of fact? How can oughts and ought-nots be true?
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For the answer to this question, we must go back to antiquity-to the thought of Aristotle. Recognizing that the descriptive mode of truth did not apply to prescriptive statements or
injunctions (which he called "practical" because they are regulative of human action), Aristotle proposed another mode of truth
appropriate to practical judgments.
That mode of truth, he said, consists in the conformity of
such judgments with right desire, as the other mode of truth
consists in the correspondence of our descriptions of reality with
the reality that they claim to describe. Unfortunately, Aristotle
did not explain what he meant by right desire. We are, therefore, on our own in pushing the inquiry farther.
What is right desire? It would appear that the answer must
be that right desire consists in desiring what we ought to desire,
as wrong desire consists in desiring what we ought not to desire.
What ought one to desire? The answer cannot be-simply
and without qualification-that we ought to desire what is good.
The good is always and only the desirable and the desirable is
always and only the good. As Plato's Socrates repeatedly pointed
out, we never desire anything that we do not, at the moment of
desiring it, deem to be good. Hence, we must somehow find a
way of distinguishing between the goods that we rightly desire
and the goods that we wrongly desire.
We are helped to do this by the distinction that Socrates
makes between the real and the apparent good. He repeatedly
reminds us that our regarding something as good because we in
fact desire it does not make it really good in fact. It may, and
often does, turn out to be the very opposite. What appears to be
good at the time we desire it may prove to be bad for us at some
later time or in the long run. The fact that we happen to desire
something may make it appear good to us at the time, but it
does not make it really good for us.
If the good were always and only that which appears good to
us because we consciously desire it, it would be impossible to
distinguish between right and wrong desire. Aristotle's conception of practical or prescriptive truth would then become null
and void. It can be given content only if we can distinguish between the apparent good (that which we call good simply because we consciously desire it at a given moment) and the real
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good (that which we ought to desire whether we do in fact desire
it or not).
Up to this point we seem to be running around in circles. We
have identified the real good with that which we ought to desire.
We have interpreted right desire as consisting in desiring what
one.ought to desire, which amounts to saying that it consists in
desiring what is really good. To say that the truth of the prescriptive or practical judgment, which tells us what we ought to
desire, consists in conformity with right desire amounts to saying that a prescription is true if it tells us that we ought to
desire what we ought to lesire. And that is saying nothing at
all.
The only way to get out of this circle is to find some way of
identifying what is really good for us that does not equate it
merely with what we ought to desire. How can that be done?
Aristotle provides us with the answer by calling out attention to
a fundamental distinction in the realm of desire.
On the one hand, there are the desires with which we are innately endowed. Because they are inherent in human nature, as
all truly specific properties are, they are present in all human
beings, just as human facial characteristics, human skeletal
structure, or human blood types are. Not only are they present
in all human beings, as inherent properties of human nature, but
they are always operative tendentially or appetitively (that is,
they always tend toward or seek fulfillment), whether or not at a
given moment we are conscious of such tendencies or drives.
On the other hand, there are the desires that each individual
acquires in the course of his or her life, each as the result of his
or her own individual temperament and by the circumstances of
his or her individual life. Consequently, unlike natural desires,
which are the same in all human beings, acquired desires differ
from individual to individual, as individuals differ in their temperaments, experiences, and the circumstances of their lives.
Also, unlike our natural desires, of which we may not be conscious at a given moment, we are always conscious of our acquired desires at the time they are motivating us in one direction or another.
The quickest and easiest way to become aware of the validity of this distinction between natural and acquired desires is to
employ two words that are in everyone's vocabulary and are in
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daily use. Let us use the word "needs" for our natural desires,
and the word "wants" for the desires we acquire. Translated into these familiar terms, what we have said so far boils down to
this: that all human beings have the same specifically human
needs, whereas individuals differ from one another with regard
to the things they want.
The use of the words "need" and "want" enables us to go
further. Our common understanding of needs provides us at
once with the insight that there are no wrong or misguided
needs. That is just another way of saying that we never need
anything that is really bad for us-something we ought to avoid.
We recognize that we can have wrong or misguided wants. That
which we want may appear to be good to us at the time, but it
may not be really good for us. Our needs are never excessive, as
our wants often are. We can want too much of a good thing, but
we can never need too much of whatever it is we need. We can
certainly want more than we need.
One thing more, and most important of all: we cannot ever
say that we ought or ought not to need something. The words
"ought" and "ought not" apply only to wants, never to needs.
This means that the natural desires that are our inborn needs
enter into the sphere of our voluntary conduct only through the
operation of our acquired desires or wants.
In other words, we may or may not in fact want what we
need. Almost all of us want things that we do not need and fail
to want things that we do need. In the statement just made lies
the crux of the matter. We ought to want the things we need.
We ought not to want the things we do not need if wanting them
interferes with our wanting-and acquiring-the things we do
need.
The distinction between needs and wants enables us to draw
the line between real goods and apparent goods. Those things
that satisfy or fulfill our needs or natural desires are things that
are really good for us. Those that satisfy our wants or acquired
desires are things that appear good to us when we consciously
desire them. If we need them as well as want them, they are also
really good for us. However, if we only want them and do not
need them, they will nevertheless appear good to us because we
want them. Beyond that, they may either turn out to be harmless or innocuous (in that they do not impede or prevent our ac-
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quiring the real goods we need) or they may turn out to be the
very opposite (quite harmful or really bad for us because they
somehow deprive us of one or another of the real goods we
need).
We cannot ever be mistaken about our wants. No one can be
incorrect in saying that he wants something. But it is quite
possible for individuals to be mistaken about their needs. Children are frequently given to thinking or saying that they need
something when they should have said that they want it. Adults
are prone to making the same mistake. If we can be mistaken
about our needs, does not that weaken the underpinning of our
argument so far? To avoid this, we must be able to determine
with substantial accuracy the needs inherent in human nature.
Since their gratification often requires the presence of certain favorable environmental circumstances, we must also be
able to determine the indispensable external conditions that
function instrumentally in the satisfaction of needs (e.g., a
healthy environment is instrumentally needed to safeguard the
health of its members). Success in these efforts depends on the
adequacy of our knowledge and understanding of human nature
in itself and in its relation to the environment.
It is by reference to our common human needs that we claim
to know what is really good for all human beings. Knowing this,
we are also justified in claiming that we can determine the truth
or falsity of prescriptions or injunctions. As Aristotle said,
prescriptions are true if they conform to right desire. All our
needs are right desires because those things that satisfy our
natural desires are things that are really good for us. When we
want what we need, our wants are also right desires.
The injunction to want knowledge, for example, is a true prescription-the true statement of an ought-because human beings all need knowledge. As Aristotle pointed out, man by
nature desires to know. Since the acquired desire for knowledge
is a right desire, because it consists in wanting what everyone
needs, the prescription "You ought to want and seek knowledge"
is universally and objectively true-true for all human beings-because it conforms to a right desire that is rooted in a
natural need. No one, I think, would question man's need for
knowledge or the truth of the prescription that everyone ought
to want and seek knowledge. That truth comes to us as the conclusion of reasoning that rests on two premises.
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The first is a categorical prescription or injunction: We
ought to desire (seek and acquire) that which is really good for
us. The second is a statement of fact about human nature: Man
has a potentiality or capacity for knowing that tends toward or
seeks fulfillment through the acquirement of knowledge. In
other words, the facts about human nature are such that, if we
are correct in our grasp of them, we can say that man needs
knowledge and that knowledge is really good for man.
Now, if the foregoing categorical prescription or injunction
is true and if, in addition, the foregoing statement of fact about
human nature involving a need for knowledge is true, then the
prescriptive conclusion, that everyone ought to want and seek
knowledge, not only follows from the premises, but is also
true-true by conforming to right desire as set forth in the
categorical prescription that we ought to want and seek that
which is really good for us (i.e., that which by nature we need).
The truth of the categorical prescription that underlies
every piece of reasoning that leads to a true prescriptive conclusion is a self-evident truth. Anyone can test this for himself by
trying to think the opposite and finding it impossible. We simply
cannot think that we ought to desire that which is really bad for
us, or that we ought not to desire that which is really good for
US.

Without knowing in advance which things are in fact really
good or bad for us, we do know at once that "ought to desire" is
inseparable in its meaning from the meaning of "really good,"
just as we know at once that the parts of a physical whole are
always less than the whole. It is impossible to think that opposite just as it is impossible to think that we ought to desire
that which is really bad for us. We acknowledge a truth as selfevident as soon as we acknowledge the impossibility of thinking
the opposite.
What about the truth of the other premise in the reasoning?
That is a factual premise. It asserts a fact about human nature.
As I pointed out a little earlier, Aristotle's observation that man
by nature desires to know seems unquestionable. Man's natural
desire or need for knowledge being acknowledged, the factual
premise can be asserted as true, if not with certitude, then with
a very high degree of assurance. It is beyond a reasonable
doubt, if not beyond the shadow of a doubt. That suffices for present purposes.
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What about other natural desires or needs, about which we
must make accurate statements of fact if we are to proceed with
reasoning that will yield us other true prescriptive conclusions?
I have already admitted that, while we can never make a misstatement about our wants, we may be mistaken about our
needs, declaring that we need something that we should have
said we wanted, or failing to recognize that we need something
that we do not want. Such mistakes would result in false rather
than true factual assertions about human nature and the desires
that are inherent in it.
The consequence of this is obvious. The prescriptive conclusions to which our practical reasoning would lead us would then
be false rather than true, practically or prescriptively false
because the errors we have made about matters of fact prevent
the conclusions from conforming to right desire. Therefore, what
remains for further inquiry is whether our knowledge of human
nature enables us to identify-with sufficient assurance, not
with certitude-the real goods that fulfill man's natural desires
or needs.
I conceded earlier that David Hume was correct in pointing
out that from our knowledge of matters of fact about reality or
real existence, and from that alone, we cannot validly reason to
a true prescriptive conclusion-a judgment about what one
ought or ought not to desire to do. In the foregoing statement, I
have italicized the "and from that alone." Upon that qualification, the correctness of Hume's point rests. It follows, therefore,
that practical or prescriptive reasoning can be validly carried on
if it does not rely upon factual knowledge alone. The reasoning
to be found earlier in this lecture relies on factual knowledge
but not on that alone. Factual knowledge is represented solely
in the second or minor premise-the one that asserts a certain
fact about human nature, for example, that man by nature
desires to know.
The prescriptive conclusion, that everyone ought to want
and seek knowledge, does not rest on that premise alone. It
rests on that premise combined with the first and major
premise-a categorical prescription that is self-evidently true,
the injunction that we ought to want and seek whatever is really
good for us. Upon this one categorical prescription rest all the
prescriptive truths we can validiate concerning the real goods
that we ought to seek, limited only by the extent to which we
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can discover, with reasonable assurance, the facts about human
nature and its inherent desires or needs.
LECTURE II: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF JUSTICE

A
The usual view, in the literature of the subject as well as in
the popular mind, accords primacy to either liberty or equality
as the highest value, the greatest good to be sought. This is not
correct. Justice is the controlling idea, without which the other
two become illusory and misleading ideals.
All three are goods-all are real, not apparent, goods, answering to basic human needs. But not all real goods are equally
good, and not all are unlimited goods (goods without any limitation in quantity). For example, wealth and pleasure are good only to a certain extent. One can seek too much of them, more than
one needs. And, in addition, wealth is good as a means, not good
in itself or for its own sake. In contrast, knowledge and virtue
are unlimited goods. One cannot have too much of them; and
though they are indispensable means to living a good human life,
they are also to be sought for their own sake.
Of these three goods-liberty, equality, and justice-only
justice is an unlimited good. One cannot seek or have too much
justice in society or in the relation of one individual to another.
But one can ask for and have too much liberty and too much
equality.
The failure to observe the limitation that should be imposed
in the quest for liberty and equality leads to serious errors and,
in addition, to an irreconcilable conflict between them.
The libertarianerror consists in a demand for freedom without limit, even though trying to achieve such unlimited freedom
results in an irreducible inequality of conditions that is unjust
and involves serious deprivations for a majority of the population. The only equality that libertarians favor is equality of opportunity and unlimited freedom: The race goes to the strongest
or the most cunning, and the devil takes the hindmost.
The egalitarianerror consists in a demand for a complete
equality of conditions, especially economic conditions, even if it
infringes on individual liberty, severely restricting equality of
opportunity and freedom of enterprise. The most glaring and

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/3

16

Adler: Ideas of Relevance to Law

19811

IDEAS OF RELEVANCE TO LAW

grievous example of the egalitarian error in recent history is the
"Cultural Revolution" in China under the rule of the Gang of
Four.
There is an irreconcilable conflict between liberty and equality when each is regarded as a primary good to be maximized
without limit. This is not really a conflict between liberty and
equality, but a conflict between two extremist misconceptions of
liberty and equality.
The conflict is resolved and removed by correcting these extremist errors: Both liberty and equality can be maximized within limits that are set by criteria of justice. The resolution can be
seen at once by considering the following questions, and the answers we must give to them.
Should an individual have unlimited freedom of action or
enterprise, or only as much as he or she can use without injuring
anyone else, without depriving them of freedom and without
causing them the serious deprivations that result from an inequality of conditions? In short, should an individual have more
liberty than he can exercise justly? The answer is that everyone
should have only as much liberty as justice allows, and no more
than that.
Should a society try to achieve an equality of conditions attended by no inequalities in the degree to which individuals enjoy that equality of conditions? Should it seek to maximize such
an equality of conditions, even if it results in wrongful deprivations of individual freedom? Should it ignore the fact (that the
Maoist egalitarians ignored) that human beings are unequal as
well as equal, in both their endowments and attainments, and
that they can make unequal contributions to the welfare of the
community? The answer is that a society should seek to achieve
only as much equality of conditions as justice requires, and no
more than that. More than that would be unjust, even as more
freedom than justice allows would be that unjust exercise of
liberty which is license. Please note: In one case, we say only as
much as justice allows; in the other, we say only as much as
justice requires.
B
What is the freedom to which, within the limits imposed by
justice, we can make a rightful claim-the liberty to which we
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are entitled? When, in the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson, following John Locke, said that liberty was one of man's
natural and unalienable rights, what liberty did he have in
mind?
To answer that question, we must first distinguish three major forms of freedom.
One is natural freedom-the freedom of a free will, of free
choice, which enables us to choose otherwise. Either we are born
with this freedom, as an innate and inherent component of our
nature or we do not have it. No society or set of external circumstances can confer it upon us. Hence, there is no sense in
speaking of our right to it.
The second major form of liberty is acquired freedom-the
freedom of the virtuous or wise individual who is able to will as
he ought to will, able to conform to the requirements of the
moral or civil law by overcoming the resistance of contrary passions or appetites. Hence, this being a liberty that individuals
either do or do not acquire through the exercise of their natural
freedom, a liberty that no society or set of circumstances can
confer, there is no sense in speaking of our right to it.
The third major form of liberty is circumstantial
freedom-the freedom that is conferred on individuals by external circumstances that either permit or enable them to do as
they please, to act as they wish, to carry out in action the
choices or decisions they freely make, wisely or unwisely.
Negatively, this freedom consists in the absence of coercion,
duress, constraints, impediments, or the lack of enabling means.
It is a freedom from. Positively, this freedom consists in the
possession of enabling means-a freedom to do as one wishes
because one has access to the requisite means. This circumstantial freedom is possessable by bad persons as well as good.
Natural freedom and acquired freedom are not indispensable
antecedents of circumstantial freedom.
Of the three major forms of freedom, only circumstantial
freedom, the freedom to do as we please, needs to be regulated
by justice. Herein lies the distinction between liberty and
license.
Liberty consists in doing as we please lawfully, or within the
limits set by justice. License consists in doing as we please
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unlawfully, or in violation of the limits set by justice. Furthermore, to ask for unlimited circumstantial freedom is to ask for
anarchic freedom-for autonomy rather than liberty. Autonomy
is incompatible with living in society under law and government.
The distinction between liberty and license, and between
autonomy and freedom in society, leads us to a further freedom,
a variant of circumstantial freedom, which is also a liberty to
which all human beings are entitled.
This is political liberty: Not a freedom to do as we please,
but the freedom of an enfranchised citizen, governed with his
own consent and with a voice in government, and, therefore,
self-governing to the extent of his participation in government.
This liberty is the freedom of which slaves and the subjects of
despotic rule are completely deprived.
The citizen with political liberty is not free from regulation
by law, but is free under laws that are just and justly made
(with consent), as well as free in all matters where the law
prescribes not. Locke's basic insight was that the rule of law in a
constitutional or republican government is the very bulwark of
freedom-especially freedom from unwarranted interference by
others. Here Mill made an error. He thought that the sphere of
freedom contracts as the sphere of law or regulated conduct expands. One further insight lies in Aristotle's observation that
only criminals are coerced by just laws, not virtuous or lawabiding individuals who would voluntarily do what such laws
command even if no laws commanded it. What the criminal is deprived of by law enforcement is not liberty, but license.
I come now to the most fundamental point of all. Our possession of free will-the power of free choice-is indispensable to
our having a right to the circumstantial freedom to do as we
please within the limits set by justice.
Our natural rights are grounded on our natural needs.
Because we have freedom of choice, as a natural endowment, we
have a natural need to be able to carry out in action the choices
or decisions we freely make. What good would it do to make decisions that we cannot carry out? Without liberty of action, our
freedom of choice would be rendered totally ineffective. We
would be exercising it without being able to achieve the goods
we are under a moral obligation to seek. Brute animals in cages

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84

are not deprived of a freedom to which they are entitled because, being brutes, they lack the freedom of choice or free will
that human beings possess.
With regard to political liberty, the reasoning runs parallel.
We have a natural right to such freedom because, being by
nature political animals, we have a natural need to participate in
politics, to be self-governing individuals. We are born to be
citizens with suffrage.
C
With regard to equality, as with regard to liberty, it is
necessary to consider its forms or dimensions.
First, we must distinguish between personal and circumstantial equality. Personal equality, or inequality, consists in
the equality, or inequality, of individuals with respect to their
innate endowments or acquired attainments. Circumstantial
equality, or inequality, consists in an equality or inequality of
conditions or of opportunity.
Next, we must observe that our statements about equality
and inequality may be either declarative or prescriptive. They
are declarative when they assert, as a matter of fact, that individuals are or are not equal in certain respects, either personally or circumstantially. They are prescriptive when they
assert that individuals who are equal in a certain respect should
be treated equally, or assert that individuals who are unequal in
a certain respect should be treated unequally.
Our statements with regard to personal equality or inequality are always and only declarative, never prescriptive. It makes
no sense to say that persons should be equal or unequal in their
endownments or attainments. Prescriptive statements, demanding equality or unequality, apply only to circumstantial equality-equality of results or equality of opportunity. Hence, criteria of justice apply only to circumstantial equality, never to
personal equality.
We come now to what is the most important distinction in
our consideration of equality, as governed by considerations of
justice. Equality in degree consists in that equality whereby one
individual is neither more nor less than another in a given
respect. Two individuals are unequal in degree if, in a certain
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respect, one is more and the other is less. In contrast, equality in
kind occurs when two individuals both have a certain condition,
even though one may have more of it, and the other less. Two individuals are unequal in kind if one possesses or enjoys a condition that the other totally lacks.
Let us consider examples of this basic difference between
equality in degree and equality in kind.
All citizens with suffrage are politically equal, though all do
not have equal amounts of political power. Citizens in public office exercise more political power than citizens out of office. In
any society in which some individuals have the status of citizenship and some are deprived of it (either as slaves or as disfranchised subjects), an inequality of political conditions exist, and
this is an inequality in kind, not an inequality in degree. In a constitutional democracy, in which all mature and competent individuals enjoy the status of citizenship, an equality of political
conditions exists, accompanied by inequalities in the degree of
political power exercised.
An equality of economic conditions exists in a society when
every one has that minimal amount of wealth, in the form of
economic goods, which any human being needs to lead a decent
human life. In short, when all are haves, and none are have-nots.
An inequality of economic conditions exists in a society in which
some portion of the population are haves with respect to wealth
or needed economic goods, and some are have-nots, seriously
deprived of economic goods that everyone needs. When all are
economic haves and none are have-nots, some may have more
and some may have less wealth.
The basic point to be observed here is that political and
economic equality in kind may be accompanied by political and
economic inequality in degree.
We are now prepared to consider the equalities to which all
human beings are entitled.
The basis of our right to circumstantial equality in kind
(either political or economic) is our natural equality in kind -our
equality as persons, as human beings, having the same human
nature. As members of the human species, we are all equally
persons. This personal equality in kind is accompanied by many
inequalities in degree. Though, as human beings, as members of
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the same species, we all possess the same specific attributes or
traits, we do not possess them as individuals to the same degree:
one individual has more, another less, of a trait common to both.
Only in their common humanity are all individuals equal. In all
other respects, any two individuals may be either equal or unequal in the degree to which they possess this or that human
trait.
The natural equality of all individuals as human beings or
persons carries with it their equality with respect to all natural
rights, since these are grounded on the natural needs inherent
in individuals' common human nature. It makes no sense to say
that some human beings have a natural right that others lack; or
that some have more of a natural right and others less.
The natural equality of all human beings, together with
their equal possession of natural rights, entitles all to equal
liberty under law; equality of political status; economic equality,
with none deprived of that minimum sufficiency of wealth that
everyone needs to lead a decent human life.
The natural equality in kind of all individuals does not call
for an equality in kind that is attended by no inequalities in
degree. In short, it does not call for equality in degree, but only
equality in kind and one that is accompanied by inequalities in
degree.
In the political sphere, an illegitimate equality of conditions-more than justice requires-would consist in a direct
democracy in which there were no public officials and in which
all citizens exercised equal amounts of political power. This involves an egalitarianism so extreme that it could not possibly
exist in any modern society, and probably never existed in the
past under much simpler conditions.
In the economic sphere, an illegitimate equality of conditions-more than justice requires-would consist in all individuals having and holding equal amounts of wealth. This involves an egalitarianism so extreme that it is unfeasible, except
perhaps in a monastic community under the strictest view of
poverty observed by all.
Whereas the equality that justice requires is an equality in
kind with respect to political and economic conditions, the inequalities that justice also requires are inequalities in degree
with regard to these conditions. It is neceessary here to
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remember that two facts control our thinking: on the one hand,
that all human beings are equal as persons or in their humanity;
on the other hand, that individuals are unequal, one to another,
in the degree of their native endowments and their acquired attainments. They may also be unequal in what they do-in the
political or economic contributions that they make.
Justice involves two principles, not one: (1) Rendering to
each what is his or her due-what is his or hers by natural
rights; (2) Treating equals equally and unequals unequally in proportion to their inequality.
In the political sphere, the application of the second of these
two principles results in giving more political power to those
who, as public officials, are constitutionally responsible for doing
more. That responsibility arises from the political tasks constitutionally assinged to the offices they hold. The degree of
power should be proportionate to the degree of lawful responsibility. In the economic sphere, all do not contribute equally to
the production of wealth. Justice here calls for a distribution
that is based on the principle: to each according to his contribution.
Are there any limits to the inequalities in degree of power
or wealth that justice requires according to the second principle
that recognizes inequalities of performance and contribution?
The answer is definitely yes. The operation of the second
principle of justice must not conflict with the operation of the
first principle, which takes precedence over the second. In short,
inequalities in degree of political power or degree of wealth are
allowable only if they do not preclude the political or economic
equality in kind to which all are entitled as a matter of natural
right. No one is entitled to more political power or more wealth
than is compatible with everyone's having the political power
and wealth to which there is a right.
A non-egalitarian democratic socialism prevails when each
receives what everyone naturally needs, and some receive more
than others in varying degrees according to the differences
among them in regard to their political performance or their
economic contribution. When justice is fulfilled with regard to
both liberty and equality, and is not exceeded with regard to
either, the result is a non-egalitarian democracy and a nonegalitarian socialsm.
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D
The domain of justice is divided into (a) the justice of the individual in relation to other individuals and to the community;
and (b) the justice of the state and of government in relation to
its people, the governed.
There are three modes of justice. First, justice exists in
rendering to each what is his due-what is rightfully his, including the right to liberty and the right to equality and inequality of conditions. Second, justice consists in dealing fairly in
exchanges and in distributions: treating equals unequally is unfair; unjustifiable discriminations are unfair: differential wages
paid to men and women doing the same tasks; unfairness in exchange as with weighted scales, giving less for more is unfair.
Third, justice consists in acting for the common good or general
welfare: treason is unjust-not a violation of rights, not unfair,
but contrary to the common good; so, too, the public official who
usurps power and exceeds his legitimate authority; or the judge
who accepts a bribe and corrupts due process of law.
These three modes of justice are irreducible to one another.
No theory of justice is sound or adequate unless it includes all
three and puts them in proper relation to one another. This explains the inadequacy of Professor Rawls's theory of justice as
fairness, compared with Aristotle's and Aquinas's much more
comprehensive doctrines.
Justice on the part of the state or community toward its
members involves all three modes: in rendering to each what is
his due and securing all natural rights for all; in treating all fairly
with no unjust discriminations; and in making laws for the common good of all, not for the sake of the private interests of any
faction, least of all those in power. By these criteria, constitutional democracy is the most just, the only perfectly just, form
of government. And the socialism which aims at having all participate in the general economic welfare is the most just
economic system.
E
Now let us consider justice in relation to law and as the
ultimate ground for the authority of the law. Here the basic issue is between those who say that might makes right and those
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who say that the exercise of force or power without authority is
illegitimate and unjust.
On the one hand, we have the position of the positivist
(Thrasymachus, Ulpian, Hobbes, Austin) that man-made law is
the only source and measure of what is just and unjust in the
conduct of individuals.
On the other hand, we have the position of the naturalist
(Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke) that man-made law has authority only to the extent that it is just. Let us remember here what
Augustine said: that an unjust law is a law in name only. It has
coercive force, but no authority; it is obeyed only from fear of
coercion.
Man-made laws can be just in the three ways already indicated: by securing natural rights; by requiring fairness in exchanges and distributions; by being directed to the common good
or general welfare; and, in addition, by emanating from those
constitutionally authorized (with the consent of the governed) to
legislate or make laws by due process.
Drastic consequences flow from these opposed views of
justice in relation to law.
Here are the consequences of the positivist view of justice
as subservient to positive law (the man-made law of the state).
Positive laws, constitutions, and governments cannot be appraised as just or unjust. Being the source and measure of justice, they cannot be judged by any applicable criteria of justice.
What is just or unjust in one community may be the very opposite in another. The saying of the ancient sophists was that
fire burns in Greece and in Persia (natural law), but what is just
in Greece and in Persia are not the same, for their conventions
(their positive laws) are different.
Here are the consequences of the naturalist view of the manmade law as measured by principles of natural justice (justice
considered as antecedent to such laws). States, governments,
constitutions, and positive laws can be judged to be just or unjust, according as they conform or violate the principles of justice. What is just or unjust is always and everywhere the same:
e.g., chattel slavery, the disfranchisement of women, the deprivations suffered by the destitute.
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However, there are some positive laws concerning matters
that are intrinsically neither just nor unjust, but morally indifferent; for example, traffic ordinances. Herein lies the distinction between mala per se (murder, theft, slander, mayhem) and
mala prohibita (driving on the wrong side of the road, wrong not
in itself, but only because it violates a man-made ordinance).
We are now prepared to consider a resolution of conflicting
theories of justice in relation to law. In the history of the subject, there have been three competing theories about the just
and the unjust.
(1) The ancient view first advanced by Socrates in the Republic: the naturalist view that what is just and unjust can be
determined without reference to man-made laws, and by reference to natural rights or to what is fair.
(2) The equally ancient, opposing view advanced by Thrasymachus against Socrates: the positivist view that might makes
right, that what the enforceable law of those in power prescribes is just and what it prohibits is unjust.
(3) The 19th century view advanced by utilitarians and pragmatists that what is just and unjust can be determined by reference to what is for or against the common good or general welfare.
Though I favor the naturalist view as the soundest of these
three, it goes too far if it claims to answer all questions about
justice by reference to natural rights or by reference to criteria
of fairness in exchanges and distributions. Some questions of
justice remain that can be answered only be reference to the
utilitarian criterion of what is expedient for the common good or
general welfare.
In addition, it must be conceded that about matters otherwise indifferent (neither intrinsically just nor unjust, neither
more nor less expedient for the general welfare), those with
legislative responsibility must make a choice between alternative prescriptions or regulations. Driving on the left side of
the road is not more just and not more expedient than driving
on the right side. But for the peace, order, and safety of the community, one or the other rule of the road must be prescribed and
enforced. And when it is, conformity with that regulation is just
conduct; violation of it, unjust.
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We are now in a position to see a resolution of the conflict
among theories of justice in relation to law. It involves three
steps.
1. Everything that is naturally just by reference to natural
rights or by reference to principles of fairness is also expedient
for the common good or general welfare. Herein lies the truth of
the naturalist view that justice is, by these criteria, antecedent
to positive law and also the source of authority in man-made
laws.
2. Everything that is determined to be expedient for the
common good or general welfare is just even if that involves no
reference to natural rights or criteria of fairness. Herein lies the
truth in the utilitarian or pragmatic view, which also claims that
justice by this criterion is antecedent to positive law and the
source of authority in man-made laws.
3. Some things are indifferent to all of the foregoing
criteria, as the example of alternative traffic regulations so
plainly shows. In the public interest, a choice between the indifferent alternatives must be made. Hence, when the determination is made by the enactment of a positive law (a particular
traffic ordinance), the law becomes the standard for judging
behavior as just or unjust because the determination was made
for the general welfare. Herein lies the truth in the positivist
view, but it should be added that it presupposes the truth in the
utilitarian or pragmatic view, since making a choice between
otherwise indifferent -alternatives is dictated by considerations
of what is expedient for the general welfare.
F
Finally, we come to two soul-searching questions about
justice, questions we are indebted to Plato for raising and trying
to answer.
Why should anyone be just? How does the individual profit
by being just to others? How does his being just contribute to
his own happiness or his leading a good life?
Such virtues as temperance and fortitude clearly serve the
interests of the individual. The intemperate and the cowardly
person clearly injures himself by making the wrong choices -by
overindulging his appetites for sensual pleasures, by not endur-
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ing the pains or hardships involved in seeking what is really
good for himself. Not so in the case of justice: the just man is
one who does good to others or at least abstains from injuring
others. Justice does not seem to be concerned with the good of
the individual who acts justly. Why, then, Plato asks, should a
man not be unjust to others if it is expedient to do so in his own
interest? Why should he be just unless it is expedient to act
justly in order to avoid adverse consequences, such as punishment or social disapproval?
To this extremely difficult question, Plato answers in terms
of an internal harmony of all the moral virtues. This answer is
more fully developed by Aristotle's theory that moral virtue, indispensable for the pursuit of happiness, has three inseparable
aspects, of which justice is one. Temperance, courage, and justice are not three separate virtues, of which we can have one or
two without having all three. They are three inseparable as-pects of moral virtue as an indivisible whole. Since moral virtue
as a whole is an indispensable means to making a good human
life, being just toward others profits the individual by facilitating his own pursuit of happiness.
We come, finally, to the other difficult question that Plato
raised. What should one prefer or choose-to do injustice to
others or to suffer injustice at their hands? This is not an academic question. It occurs often in our lives. We are often faced
with the choice between doing injustice or suffering injury for
not doing it.
Plato's answer was, in my judgment, too simple and was based
on an inadequate theory of the good. That inadequate theory
consists in maintaining that moral virtue is the only good.
Socrates in the Apology said that no harm can come to a good
man in this life or the next. The Stoics and Immanuel Kant reiterated this view: the only thing that is really good is a good
will-a virtuous will. Accordingly, it follows that in being unjust
to others one abandons one's own ultimate good; whereas, in
contrast, suffering injustice done by others does not diminish
one's virtue or good will in the least.
A sounder answer to this difficult question is based on
Aristotle's more adequate theory of the good. Moral virtue is only
one of the real goods. Wealth, pleasure, health, liberty, knowledge, friendship, and so on, are also real goods. The loss of moral
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virtue is a serious obstacle to the achievement of happiness; but
so also is the loss of liberty, the deprivation of wealth, the impairment of one's health. Hence the choice between doing and
suffering injustice must be based upon the following considerations.
On the one hand, to what extent will the threatened injustice to be suffered injure me in a way that will seriously impede my pursuit of happiness? On the other hand, faced with the
choice between committing injustice in this one instance or suffering serious injury by refusing to act unjustly, can I commit
this one act of injustice without losing my moral virtue? The
answer to this latter question is yes. Moral virtue is an habitual
disposition to act in morally correct ways, and that habit of right
choice and right conduct is neither formed by a single right
choice and action, nor destroyed by a single wrong one.
It follows, therefore, that it may be clearly preferable, in
certain instances, to do injustice, if doing it, in the particular instance, is the only way one can avoid serious injury as a consequence of suffering injustice at the hands of others.
G
One final remark, even if it must be brief and, therefore, not
fully explained.
I said at the beginning that liberty, equality, and justice constitute one triad of great ideas. The other, and even more basic,
triad is truth, goodness, and beauty.
I hope it has become apparent from the foregoing treatment
of liberty, equality, and justice that an adequate account of
these three important ideas ultimately rests on an adequate
theory of the good. And an adequate theory of the good, I would
like to add, rests on an adequate account of truth-an account
that explains the truth of prescriptive statements about what
ought or ought not to be done and sought, as well as the truth of
descriptive statements about what does or does not exist.
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